Land Use Law Update: The Court of Appeals Issues a Victory for Home Rule in Wallach v. Town of Dryden and Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v. Town of Middlefield by Adams-Schoen, Sarah
Digital Commons @ Touro Law 
Center 
Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship 
2014 
Land Use Law Update: The Court of Appeals Issues a Victory for 
Home Rule in Wallach v. Town of Dryden and Cooperstown 
Holstein Corp. v. Town of Middlefield 
Sarah Adams-Schoen 
sadams-schoen@tourolaw.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/scholarlyworks 
 Part of the Land Use Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
28 Mun. Law. 43 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ Touro Law 
Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ 
Touro Law Center. For more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu. 
NYSBA  Municipal Lawyer  |  Summer 2014  |  Vol. 28  |  No. 3 43
According to the major-
ity, the OGSML is not such 
a restriction on the adoption 
of zoning laws because it 
only supersedes “all local 
laws or ordinances relating 
to the regulation of the oil, 
gas and solution mining 
industries” and not the des-
ignation of areas in which 
mining is either permitted 
or prohibited.8 Since zoning 
does not regulate mining 
or the mining industry, but 
rather designates the areas where mining is permitted, 
the Court found that local zoning laws do not consti-
tute regulation of the industry and are therefore not 
covered by the OGSML supersession clause. 
This language in the OGSML is virtually identi-
cal to language in the Mined Land Reclamation Law 
(MLRL) considered by the Court in Frew Run 25 years 
ago.9 In Frew Run, the Court of Appeals held that the 
MLRL’s prohibition against “local laws relating to the 
extractive mining industry” did not preempt local 
zoning laws. The Frew Run Court had interpreted this 
language in conjunction with municipal home rule 
powers and concluded that “local laws that purported 
to regulate the ‘how’ of mining activities and opera-
tions were preempted whereas those limiting ‘where’ 
mining could take place were not.”10 Thus, it would 
seem that the only path the Court could have taken to 
strike Dryden’s and Middlefi eld’s zoning laws would 
have been to overrule Frew Run. 
In the authors’ opinion, the Court’s analysis 
conforms to traditional concepts of municipal zoning 
authority. Practically speaking, zoning laws have al-
ways regulated where businesses, such as retail stores, 
banking, and gas stations may be located, but not how 
they operate (e.g., hours of operation and labor poli-
cies).11 No basis in law exists for treating zoning related 
to extractive mining processes differently. 
What then of the Towns of Dryden’s and Middle-
fi eld’s absolute ban on mining via their zoning laws? 
Weren’t they regulation of mining? 
Not according to the majority. While the local 
ordinance in Frew Run delineated the zoning districts 
in which mining was banned, the local law under 
consideration in Gernatt, the other case upon which 
In the midst of the often 
heated controversy swirling 
around the issue of hydrau-
lic fracturing (commonly 
referred to as “hydrofrack-
ing” and “fracking”), the 
Court of Appeals recently 
issued a straightforward 
ruling, which focused on 
long-established precedent 
concerning the right of 
municipalities to regulate 
mining land uses, rather 
than focusing on the conten-
tious economic or environmental issues surrounding 
the fracking debate.
Wallach and Dryden were two appeals brought on 
behalf of gas and oil interests that sought to overturn 
two Third Department rulings rejecting challenges 
to the upstate towns of Dryden’s and Middlefi eld’s 
zoning enactments, which banned fracking operations 
within their boundaries.1 Appellants Norse Energy 
Corp. USA and Cooperstown Holstein Corporation as-
serted that the towns lacked the authority to proscribe 
fracking because the text of section 23-0303(2) of the 
Environmental Conservation Law (ECL), which is the 
supersession clause in the Oil, Gas and Solution Mining 
Law (OGSML), demonstrated that the state legislature 
intended to preempt local zoning laws that curtailed 
energy production. 
On June 30, 2014, a 5-2 majority of the Court of 
Appeals affi rmed the Third Department in a single 
opinion authored by Judge Graffeo. The majority ap-
plied Article IX of the State Constitution,2 which is the 
“home rule” provision, the Municipal Home Rule Law,3 
and the Court’s holdings in Frew Run Gravel Products v. 
Town of Carroll4 and Matter of Gernatt Asphalt Products 
v. Town of Sardinia5 to arrive at the conclusion that “the 
Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Law (“OGSML”) does 
not preempt the home rule authority vested in munici-
palities to regulate land use.”6 
New York State Constitution Article IX is the 
provision that grants local governments the author-
ity to regulate land use and provides that “every local 
government shall have power to adopt and amend 
local laws not inconsistent with the provisions of this 
constitution or any general law …except to the extent 
that the legislature shall restrict the adoption of such 
local law.”7 
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land use is at stake. Rather, [the Court] will invalidate 
a zoning law only where there is a ‘clear expression 
of legislative intent to preempt local control over land 
use.”20 And here, following the analytical framework 
articulated in Frew Run, the Court reaffi rmed that the 
OGSML did not contain a clear expression of legislative 
intent to preempt local control over land use.
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Judge Graffeo’s opinion relied, eliminated mining as a 
permitted use anywhere in the town borders. In Ger-
natt, the Court of Appeals, relying on Frew Run, ruled 
that an absolute mining ban was a reasonable use of a 
town’s police and zoning powers.12 
Relying on Gernatt, Judge Graffeo upheld the two 
towns’ actions:
Manifestly, Dryden and Middlefi eld 
engaged in a reasonable exercise of their 
zoning authority as contemplated in 
Gernatt when they adopted local laws 
clarifying that oil and gas extraction 
and production were not permissible 
uses in any zoning districts.…
[T]here is no meaningful distinction be-
tween the zoning ordinance we upheld 
in Gernatt, which “eliminate[d] mining 
as a permitted use” in Sardinia, and 
the zoning laws here classifying oil and 
gas drilling as prohibited land uses in 
Dryden and Middlefi eld.13 
The opinion was also careful to emphasize that it 
was passing no judgment on the merits of fracking and 
noted that “[t]hese appeals are not about whether hy-
drofracking is benefi cial or detrimental to the economy, 
environment or energy needs of New York.”14 Rather, 
the Court explained, the appeals are concerned only 
with “the relationship between the State and its local 
government subdivisions, and their respective exercise 
of legislative power.”15
Writing for the dissent, Judge Pigott took the view, 
in which Judge Smith concurred, that the zoning laws 
of “Dryden and Middlefi eld do more than just regulate 
land use, they regulate oil, gas, and solution mining 
industries under the pretext of zoning.”16 The dissent 
argued that the Dryden and Middlefi eld ordinances are 
distinguishable from the ordinances in Frew Run and 
Gernatt, because the Dryden and Middlefi eld ordinanc-
es apply to the entire municipality and do more than 
eliminate fracking as a permitted use by, for example, 
going into detail concerning prohibitions against gas 
storage, petroleum exploration, and production materi-
als and equipment.17 
Rejecting these arguments, the majority reaffi rmed 
that “the regulation of land use through the adoption 
of zoning ordinances [is]…one of the core powers of 
local governance,”18 noting that the Court has “repeat-
edly highlighted the breadth of a municipality’s zoning 
powers ‘to provide for the development of a balanced, 
cohesive community’ in consideration of regional 
needs and requirements.”19 The majority explained 
that the Court does not “lightly presume preemption 
where the preeminent power of a locality to regulate 
